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Research Highlights and Abstract 
This article: 
• Examines the meaning of claims for ‘recognition’ and struggles against ‘misrecognition’ by working 
through aspects of Muslim political agency in contemporary British politics; 
• Contributes to research on the political mobilisation of Muslims in Britain by examining how civil society 
organisations respond to perceived stigmas and project a Muslim civic identity; 
• Contributes to research that investigates dilemmas of political agency between the pressure to conform 
to standards of neutrality and maturity, on the one hand, and creativity and opposition, on the other; 
• Demonstrates how minority actors manoeuvre and position themselves in the unsettled environment of 
contemporary British politics. 
It is a common complaint among Muslim civil society organisations that their presence in British politics is 
misconstrued. An increasing number of activists and groups are concerned to repudiate what they perceive to be 
the misperception of their political agency as exceptional and difficult to accommodate. Organisations and 
initiatives thus project and practice civic identities, to demonstrate that they are committed to the ‘common good’. 
This article explores how a number of organisations positioned themselves in response to experiences of 
‘misrecognition’ in the context of the General Election 2010. With this conceptual focus we explore one of the 
most pertinent characteristics of Muslim political agency in Britain today: how actors respond to perceived 
pressures, make claims and project identities in opposition to alleged misperceptions or the refusal to 
acknowledge their desired self-descriptions. The article draws on a set of qualitative interviews with 
representatives of advocacy organisations that mobilised Muslim constituents in the run-up to the General 
Election 2010. 
Introduction 
It is a common complaint among Muslim civil society organisations that their presence in British politics is 
misconstrued. For example, and notwithstanding a broader commitment to pluralism in British politics, activists 
who mobilise on the basis of Muslim religious identities often encounter the charge that they foster sectarian 
divisions.1 Hence, following his victory in the Bradford West by-election, a salient trope emerged that George 
Galloway's success owed everything to electoral choices made by a Muslim voting block. What was less 
immediately noted was the role of young voters and disenchantment with Labour's alleged exploitation of kinship 
networks (biraderi). Right-wing commentators meanwhile converged on the view that Galloway's success 
showed ‘that sectarian politics are now alive and well in Britain’ (Murray 2010) and that British Muslims eagerly 
responded when they were addressed ‘not as primarily British citizens but solely as Muslims’ (Pollard 2012). As 
an example for the ‘ugly alliance between the far left and Islamists’, Abhijit Pandya (2012) pointed to ‘groups like 
Operation Black Vote and the Muslim Public Affairs Committee [that] are busy encouraging such communities to 
vote along racial and religious lines.’ 
There is of course a prevailing political context here. Organisations that attempt to mobilise minority citizens by 
appealing, in one way or another, to collective concerns, interests and identities, find themselves in situations 
where they have to respond to representations that they believe do not adequately characterise their objectives. 
Muslim participation in British politics is profoundly affected by this. In response, an increasing number of 
advocacy groups are concerned to repudiate what they perceive to be misperceptions of Muslim agency as 
exceptional and difficult to accommodate. Frequently, these organisations and initiatives seek to project and 
practice civic identities, to demonstrate their normality and a commitment to the ‘common good’. 
This article focuses on such efforts in the context of the general election 2010. It draws on qualitative research 
into campaigns of the most active mobilising actors: the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), ENGAGE, the Muslim 
Public Affairs Committee (MPAC) the Youelect initiative, and, as a non-Muslim group, the aforementioned 
Operation Black Vote (OBV). A relevant similarity is that these groups have at times been accused of fostering 
extremism, while being more commonly blamed for encouraging British Muslims to engage in silos, away from 
the mainstream. These accusations are being made from across the political spectrum, including by co-
religionists, such as the Liberal Democrat candidate for Hampstead and Kilburn, Maajid Nawaz.2 While the 
organisations whose work we survey here represent (with the exception of OBV) different shades of British 
Muslim politics, they all find themselves vulnerable to such accusations and feel the need to respond. The article 
explores this response and so allows us to bring pertinent features of British Muslim political agency into focus. 
This includes how actors respond to perceived pressures, make claims and project identities in opposition to 
alleged misperceptions or the refusal to acknowledge their desired self-descriptions. The article focuses on 
political agency in response to the experience of misrecognition. It deliberately chooses not to review in 
significant detail the socio-political and demographic context of British Muslim electoral politics. It equally does 
not address the reality of anti-Muslim bias, such as in the British press (see, however, the recent Ethnic Minority 
Election Survey; e.g., Sobolewska et al., 2011). Instead, we employ and problematise the concept of 
‘misrecognition’ to help theorise these processes (see Moore, Mason and Lewis, 2008; McEnery, Baker and 
Gabriealatos, forthcoming 2013). 
The article draws on a set of qualitative interviews with representatives of the organisations listed above that 
were conducted in early 2012. It supplements their accounts with a study of campaign materials published in the 
run-up to the general election. Developing the conceptual frame, the article begins by locating the concept of 
misrecognition within normative and political theory (Section 1). It then outlines fives ‘modalities’ of the 
experience of misrecognition that are discernible in how Muslim political actors conceive of their wider political 
environment (Section 2). After this, the article works through three significantly contested issues that require a 
response from all organisations under investigation: namely, minority representation (Section 3), the character of 
‘the Muslim Vote’ (Section 4) and political neutrality (Section 5). It concludes by suggesting that misrecognition 
allows for a constructive perspective on Muslim politics but needs to be expanded in order to conceive of 
creative, rather than merely reactive, aspects of minority political agency. 
The Concept of Misrecognition 
Beginning with our theoretical concern, misrecognition is a term that is obviously relational to recognition, and the 
two most prominent proponents of the latter concept began their dialogues with the same source. Charles 
Taylor's (1994) essay on ‘The Politics of Recognition’ and Axel Honneth's (1994) book Kampf um 
Anerkennung engage with—both appropriating and departing from—Hegel's philosophical system. For example, 
shadowing Hegel's account of the three arenas of recognition (family, civil society and the state), Honneth argues 
that there are threemodes of recognition, which he refers to as love, respect and esteem. Love is the mode of 
recognition which, all being well, we receive from our small circle of significant others. Respect is that mode 
which we experience when our fellow citizens regard us as rights-bearing individuals. Esteem is the sort of 
recognition we enjoy when we are valued for our distinct contributions to society's collective goals. Taylor, 
meanwhile, offers a philosophical and historical account of how recognition reflects ‘a vital human need’ (1994, 
26), one crucial to our ability to become full human agents. This claim stems from the Hegelian premise of the 
fundamentally dialogical character of human identity which Taylor (1989) elaborated in Sources of the Self. That 
is, one can become a self, capable of self-understanding and achieving ‘self-definition’, only in relation to other 
conversation partners, within ‘webs of interlocution’ (1989, 32, 36). In political terms, the concern with recognition 
thus allows us, as Nancy Fraser (2013, 4) acknowledges despite some misgivings about the concept, to 
‘broaden, and to radicalize, the concept of justice’ by bringing into view the subject- and group-specific 
consequences of hitherto unnoticed forms of oppression, as well as the harm suffered by the systematic 
experience of social bias. 
Interestingly, the two leading authors on recognition spend relatively little time elaborating on the circumstances 
of misrecognition (cf. Martineau et al. 2012; Meer et al. 2012). For Taylor, the concept is a taken-for-granted 
inversion of recognition. To those affected, he argues, misrecognition inflicts ‘real damage, real distortion, if the 
people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of 
themselves’ (Taylor 1994, 25). Honneth offers a marginally more sustained elaboration of misrecognition, 
regarding it as ‘the withdrawal of social recognition, in the phenomena of humiliation and disrespect’ (Fraser and 
Honneth 2003, 134). Yet in both cases the specifically political conditions for this harm to occur, or how those that 
are misrecognised act in response, is largely unexplored. In seeking to redress the lack of concern for political 
agency in such theorisations of recognition, Saba Mahmood (2005, 18, emphasis in original) highlights the 
‘capacity for action that specific relations of subordination create and enable’. Misrecognition, following 
Mahmood, is an unhelpful device if it is solely concerned with the assertion of pre-existing and stable identities 
that are articulated against social stigma. Instead, we should explore the subjectivities that emerge within social 
environments of subordination and misrecognition. 
Regardless of the philosophical implications of Mahmood's position, this would require us to be contextually 
specific about the types of self-understandings that emerge in the case of minority politics, and so not to prejudge 
modalities of agency on the basis of uniform or detached conceptions of ‘the’ minority experience. It also means 
paying attention to how political identities and claims are adapted in conjunction with, rather than just asserted 
against, prevailing biases. Yet it still remains the case that a significant number of political actors who negotiate 
such biases do conceive of their social contexts as characterised by misrecognition and of themselves as 
misrecognised. Our discussion of theirexperience serves as a starting point for contextual inquiries into the 
struggle for recognition. 
More recently, there has been a political turn in understanding misrecognition, as a means to contextualise 
political mobilisations that span different categories of political recognition: from seeking statehood 
(Seymour 2012; Staples 2012) to pursing participation in the public sphere as co-citizens (Lægaard 2012; 
Martineau 2012; Meer 2012). Indeed, we suggest that this is what makes it helpful to our interest in the strands 
and processes that make up Muslim political mobilisations. Rather than being a ‘master concept’ to conceive of 
justice and human self-realisation, it can be an empirically sensitive instrument in analysing debates about formal 
participation and representation. As Honneth (1994, 274) himself suggests, it can deliver a ‘critical, interpretive 
framework’ to identify social conditions and discourses employed by actors that participate in concrete social 
struggles (see Thompson, 2012). 
As such, misrecognition can provide for an empirically sensitive perspective. What actors, or groups of actors, do 
in response to the experience of misrecognition will depend on the type of bias they encounter and the discursive 
and material opportunities that are available to them. Unless they acquiesce or resign, misrecognised actors will 
seek redress and propose alternative truths that they wish to see socially acknowledged. Significantly, this might 
entail a challenge not only to individual biases or misperceptions but also to social rules and conventions. Thus, 
James Tully (2000, 479) suggests that when 
a group puts forward a demand for recognition they seek to disclose the misrecognition or non-recognition in the 
existing rule of mutual recognition of themselves and others, to persuade others it is unjust and intolerable, and to 
display a preferred alternative. 
Tully points to acts of ‘disclosure’ in which actors seek to defeat misrecognition not just by articulating alternative 
narratives but by embodying alternative selves. Such alternatives may then be registered (or not) by majority 
actors that revise their understanding of the minority in question. Ideally, it may lead to the revision of prevailing 
social conventions and established assumptions that structure misrecognition, such as those that account for the 
sensationalising coverage in parts of the mass media. Yet even when the desired form of recognition is not 
forthcoming, the proposition of alternatives might be empowering in its own right and there are numerous 
examples for how the assertion of oppositional identities, such as that of Black Power beginning in the 1960s, 
against the social mainstream has been experienced as profoundly positive by minority groups in question. 
Drawing on this suggestion about reciprocal relationships in the struggle for recognition, there are three 
tendencies that we wish to highlight and that are open to contextually sensitive inquiry: (i) initial experiences of 
misrecognition, which motivate (ii) the disclosure of alternative truths or the embodiment of alternative identities, 
that are then (iii) socially acknowledged (or not). In the following, we focus on the first two of these moments. We 
wish to specifically address dilemmas of political agency and civic positioning in a difficult environment and thus 
examine how Muslim civic organisations respond to, are bound by and seek to transcend socio-political 
misrecognition.  
Misrecognising Muslim Agency 
Here, we discuss some of the constraints that characterise negative responses to the Muslim presence in British 
politics and outline on that basis five ‘modalities’ of misrecognition (see Table 1 below). In a first step, these 
modalities are loosely delineated, drawing on previous cases and discursive possibilities. We will then, in 
subsequent sections, apply and develop these modalities in a discussion of three contested examples. 
M1 Misrecognising Muslim identity politics as markedly different in kind to other identity politics 
M2 Misrecognising the dynamic positioning and complexity of Muslim identities and concerns 
M3 Misrecognising Muslim agency as purely reactive, grievance-based or ‘pariah politics’ 
M4 Misrecognising Muslim concerns as ‘sectarian’, not compatible with an orientation towards the common good 
M5 Misrecognising Muslim political actors as ‘toxic’ and refusing political association 
Table 1. Five Modes of Misrecognition 
As a general proposition, an equitable place for ethnic minority populations in British politics is relatively 
undisputed. However, progressives as well as conservatives frequently disavow political expressions that 
emphasise specific minority markers or that prioritise minority requests (at the expense, for example, of 
overarching ideas or ideologies that are said to ‘cover’ or ‘subsume’ such requests). As already suggested, it is in 
particular the critique of ‘identity politics’ around which left- and right-wing commentators coalesce. For example, 
Douglas Murray (2010), the former director of the neo-conservative Centre for Social Cohesion, chastised in 
particular the Tories for appealing to Muslim voters and remarked that all 
three of the major parties continue to think that the identity-group era of politics is still alive and well; that as part 
of the multiculti [sic] mindset it is inevitable that you say different things to different ‘communities’; and that 
therefore you can say anything at all to get the alleged ‘Muslim community’ to vote for you. 
On the Left, critics of ‘identity politics’ see disempowering effects of the political appeal to ethnic or religious 
identities for the communities in question and to how this emphasis reinforces hierarchies and strengthens 
conservative forces. In their manifesto, the New Generation Network(2006), for example, argued that in ‘a 
throwback to the colonial era, our politicians have chosen to appoint and work with a select band of 
representatives and by doing so treat minority groups as monolithic blocks, only interested in race or faith based 
issues rather than issues that concern us all’. This critique, and the request to ‘end communal politics’, is 
particularly directed at the political mobilisation of kinship ties, biraderiin the case of Pakistani communities (see 
Werbner 1990; Anwar 1995; Purdam 2001), which have recently been identified as one reason for the wide-
spread disenchantment that led to George Galloway's victory in Bradford West (Akthar 2012). 
While specific features of minority mobilisations, for example on the basis of informal relationships between 
community leaders and the Labour Party, are perhaps open to critique, the attack on ‘identity politics’ has a 
tendency to conflate phenomena and stigmatise minority participation altogether. This is because Race- or faith-
based mobilisations that happen to be bottom-up, do not necessarily perpetuate communal hierarchies and aren't 
manipulated by vested interests more than any other type of political assertiveness on the basis of shared 
concerns, are seen as an anomaly or ruled out as impossible. Identity politics tends to be identified with 
‘monolithic’ groups, and there is, hence, a risk that this line of critique is selectively used to marginalise and 
silence some groups, especially new entrants. In fact, a type of misrecognition (1a) that is identified by some of 
our respondents in this research is characterised by the rejection, often selectively, of group- or identity-based 
mobilisations in the case of Muslim political actors. 
Such imbalances in the rejection of ethnic minority claims apply in debates about formal representation, too. 
Commentators criticise the concern with heightening ethnic minority representation for its single-minded pursuit 
of superficial similarity. Yet the meaning of political representation, and in particular the balance between is 
largely open (see Pitkin 1967; Phillips 1995; Young 2000). As Hannah Pitkin (1967, 210) suggests, the act of 
representation can be conceived in an abstract and disconnected way, akin to the Burkean ‘representation of 
unattached interests’, or as a particular and intimate connection where close ties 
between representatives and represented are necessary because ‘interest, wants, and the like [are] definable 
only by the person who feels or has them’. It is not the case that in British parliamentary democracy, or more 
generally, the role of elected representatives is clearly conceived to follow either of these models; different 
expectations exist and claims can be modelled according to divergent understandings of what representatives 
are for and what representation is about. The suggestion that a Muslim ‘politics of presence’ or any other concern 
to increase the formal representation of specific minority groups is either exceptional or exceptionally problematic 
constitutes a related type of the same kind of misrecognition (1b). The conditions for the civic self-constitution of 
post-immigration groups are usually fragile and the request that they, sometimes even above all others, 
approximate idealised understandings of citizenship and democratic agency can be, and historically has been, an 
exclusionary device. 
British Muslims are clearly some way beyond exclusion and in the aftermath of the Rushdie affair distinct patterns 
of their political agency became more widely acknowledged (Modood 1990; O'Toole et al. 2013). Yet it has been 
suggested that the experience of stigmatisation, in the aftermath of the Satanic Verses and exacerbated after 
9/11, has led to political orientations that are primarily reactive and articulate grievances. There is a risk of 
reductionism in such accounts. British Muslim politics is characterised by diversity and, although the concern to 
defeat stigmas may be widely shared, political objectives differ in line with different religious, strategic and 
ideological commitments and follow distinct grammars of political agency (see O'Toole and Gale 2010). While 
ideological or religious commitments are clearly significant, they are not the only predictors of political activism 
among British Muslims. Some organisations, such as the MCB, liaise with decision makers and lobby behind the 
scenes. Others seek to effect political change through public engagement and awareness-raising (e.g. 
ENGAGE). Others, again, operate and mobilise predominantly locally, on the ground and through social 
networking sites (e.g. MPAC). The diversity of approaches, political sensibilities and the different ways in which 
religious identities are emphasised or have a background role reflects heterogeneity. The reluctance to 
acknowledge this diversity and the dynamism of political agency among British Muslims constitutes a second 
type of misrecognition that we propose to explore below (2). 
In a similar manner, the emphasis on grievances means that the proliferation of alternative sites of Muslim civil 
society—in terms of media production and consumption, community and religious activism, and arenas for 
Muslim dissent—risks being ignored. This proliferation is considered as evidence of withdrawal rather than 
political pluralisation of the public sphere. Accounts that treat Muslim agency as purely reactive face a related 
objection. It is hardly the case that outside pressures always determine the political agency of marginalised 
groups; at least they usually do not give a good account of motivations and purposes that exist beyond the 
concern to overcome pressures. ‘Excluded groups’, Modood (2005, 159, emphasis in original) suggests, ‘seek 
respect for themselves as they are or aspire to be, not simply a solidarity on the basis of a recognition of 
themselves as victims; they resist being defined by their mode of oppression and seek space and dignity for 
theirmode of being.’ The request for recognition entails the demand for spaces of self-expression that, instead of 
being governed by narrow justificatory constraints, allow for the free choice and proud articulation of different 
types of identities (Modood 2012, 2013). 
A valid assessment must therefore be sensitive to the emergence of Muslim identities that are adopted and 
deployed in various permutations by many Muslims themselves. A key issue is how this ‘Muslim-consciousness’ 
connects to the sorts of civic status that Muslims are seeking (Meer2010). The types of civic status being referred 
to include those that have prevailed for other minorities under the terms of a peculiarly British multiculturalism, 
and which have sought to promote equality of access and opportunity, and have led to some significant 
recognition of particular minority ‘differences’. In this domain and in arenas of political participation more 
generally, the concern to project political identities is as evident as the desire to overcome pressures. Its portrayal 
as driven by and reducible to grievances, purely reactive to outside pressures and devoid of positive political 
objectives, indicates a third type of misrecognition (3). 
There has been a tendency, moreover, to reject mobilisations on the basis of minority identities for its alleged 
incompatibility with a political orientation towards the ‘common good’ (4). A historical account of this position 
within the Labour Party has been vividly brought out by Les Back and John Solomos (1992). In Birmingham's 
Small Heath, the contender for the 1992 Labour candidacy—current incumbent Roger Godsiff—was challenged 
at selection meetings by minority candidates. Godsiff enjoyed support from trade unions and the national party; 
his eventual selection, however, was marred by allegations of vote-rigging. Godsiff defended his position and 
suggested that the 
trouble with people trying to become MPs now, they're trying to become MPs because they're members of an 
ethnic community, they're not trying to become MPs because they concern the whole of the community and they 
represent a philosophy. They don't understand that, they need to stop to think about it. I have to tell my 
councillors, some of whom aspire to become MPs, that their job is to represent all the constituents they've got, 
and often they're not very successful at it. And that's sad, so they still are not fully integrated into the Labour 
party, never mind the community (Interview with Roger Godsiff, MP, quoted in Back and Solomos 1992, 11). 
The suggestion appears to be that in order to be representative—to embody, for example, the ‘Labour 
philosophy'—minority concerns have to be abandoned. It is moreover the responsibility of minority politicians to 
prove their ability to represent: a burden that does not usually apply to white politicians, not even in 
constituencies with significant post-immigrant populations, such as Small Heath (43 per cent in 1992). The 
suspicion, and a related type of misrecognition that we explore in the following (4), is that Muslim agency reflects 
‘sectarian’ interests—a suspicion that can only be appeased through continuous demonstrations of a commitment 
to the ‘common good’. 
A final obstacle, frequently encountered by Muslim political actors, is the difficulty to forge alliances as a result of 
the perceived toxicity of Muslim concerns. It is clear that different organisations deal differently with such 
difficulties. The MCB, for example, has sought to establish collaborative relationships across the party-political 
spectrum. MPAC, on the other hand, adopts a more combative posture: while it endorses candidates, it maintains 
distance since the association could potentially be damaging to its endorsees. Considerations about the due 
proximity and distance, as well as neutrality and partisanship, are widely evident in the strategic thinking of the 
mobilising actors that we have interviewed. The toxicity of the Muslim association constitutes on final experience 
of misrecognition that we investigate in the following (Section 5). 
The Politics of Muslim Representation 
It is worth registering at the outset that Muslim activists, particularly those operating with a view to the national 
level, often seem strongly attuned to their political environment and thus show considerable reflexivity about 
dilemmas of formal representation. For example, a respondent for The Cordoba Foundation, who was involved in 
the Youelect initiative to mobilise Muslim voters, highlighted in fairly stark terms one of the problems entailed in a 
mere focus on increasing the parliamentary minority presence: 
We have one or two Muslim MPs that are absolutely dreadful. They happen to be Muslims but actually, they're 
dreadful, and most of their positions, you know, vis-à-vis the Muslim community, are totally negative. It doesn't 
really matter that they're Muslim (Interview, 9 January 2012). 
The ability to judge candidates on the basis of their policy record rather than their faith, this respondent 
suggested, proved that ‘the Muslim community is issue-based, and not religion-based’ (Interview, 9 January 
2012). Indeed, in the debate about political representation activists frequently appear to disavow the concern to 
heighten the Muslim presence in public institutions and highlight sophisticated, issue-based deliberations that 
they either see at work or want to promote among Muslim citizens. It is likely that frequent portrayals of Muslim 
political agency as ‘tribal’ or ‘sectarian’, and thus pre-modern and unenlightened, account for the vehemence with 
which this sophistication among Muslim voters is highlighted. 
This is particularly evident in the reference to Muslim mobilisations against Muslim candidates, which were 
positively highlighted for how ‘ideas’ trumped ‘religion’: MPAC, for example, lobbied against Khalid Mahmood's 
re-election in Birmingham's Perry Bar constituency and claimed that, while Mahmood had ‘relied on the Muslim 
vote to keep him in power’, we ‘are asking what did he do to stop the illegal wars abroad against Muslims and 
what did he do to stop the demonisation of Muslims in the UK’ (MPAC 2010). A similar line of attack was adopted 
in the Bradford West by-election where MPAC endorsed Galloway and campaigned against Labour's Imran 
Hussein: ‘to sweep aside the tired old pattern of voting in lack lustre candidates, just because they wear a red 
rosette’ (MPAC 2012). Non-Muslims were favoured over Muslim candidates, and this was noticed and indeed 
highlighted as a rejection of the unthinking support for Labour and co-religionists that was seen to have plagued a 
previous era of Muslim politics. 
Elaborating on this type of strategic thinking, a respondent for MPAC suggested that ‘we're not just saying: more 
Muslim MPs. What we're saying is that non-Muslims MPs also need to address the concerns of their Muslim 
constituents, which we feel in a large extent are being ignored’ (Interview, 28 January 2012). For the MCB, a 
respondent agreed that certain types of community politics, which he labelled as the ‘politics of representation’, 
were detrimental to Muslim interests: ‘unity is dissipating where you have vested interests competing for that 
patronage for government access’. This, he suggested, was ‘damaging to the community itself and damaging 
especially to the younger people’ (Interview, 12 January 2012). 
There is some concern, moreover, that an increased Muslim or minority presence in institutions might not further 
the cause of equality but serve to conceal the lack of serious, issue-based commitment to racial and religious 
equality. Commenting on the policy record of the current government, a respondent suggested that ‘we have a 
party that's beginning to look like the people it serves and yet […] race equality [is] going further and further 
away. Multiculturalism [is] being trashed’ (OBV, Interview, 2 February 2012). The concern is that a ‘politics of 
presence’ (Phillips 1995) achieves little if it is not accompanied by a critical concern with policy-
making after elections. While the representative for OBVhighlighted the value of increased ethnic minority 
representation, it is striking that Muslim mobilising organisations often appear to accord only secondary, if any, 
significance to this objective. 
A representative of Youelect highlighted a different set of problems. He pointed to persistent doubts about the 
Britishness of British Muslim, reflecting a situation where Muslim political agency was considered sectarian by 
default and thus incompatible with the ‘common good’: ‘at the moment, unfortunately, any Muslim, either public 
figure or otherwise, is first a Muslim, then British and therefore his views are first pinned down to his Islamic 
identity rather than the British identity’ (Interview, 25 January 2012). This leads to a situation where British 
Muslims ‘are asked to make choices that no other groups are asked to make—their identity of being Muslim or 
British first’. A different respondent pointed to his own political activism, which included a candidacy for Respect, 
as an example for a similar experience of misrecognition: ‘One of the most common questions that came my way 
was, you know, “If you decided to do this, why don't you go and establish a Muslim party?” ’ (Interview, 9 January 
2012). His response would be that ‘we don't need a Muslim party, we're calling for Muslims to be part of society, I 
don't want them to stand on one side’. 
Among those involved in the 2010 mobilisation there was thus a measure of concern about dilemmas of 
representation and in particular about the way Muslim political actors were forced to abjure their Muslimness in 
order to claim a more encompassing political identity. At the same time, the notion that increased representation 
would provide a remedy to inequality that could be achieved without serious and issue-based commitments was 
widely denounced. Arguably, one of the background conditions for this rejection of the ‘politics of presence’ was 
the concern to counter simplistic, but pervasive, representations of Muslim politics as pre-modern. There clearly 
is a strong concern to dispute accounts that equate Muslim agency with sectarianism and patronage politics and 
to emphasise and practise an alternative idea of political sophistication and maturity.  
Conceiving of the ‘Muslim Vote’ 
The ‘Muslim Vote’, and how Muslim political actors conceive of its significance and coherence, points in a 
different direction for our concern with the type of political positioning that emerges in contexts of misrecognition. 
As with formal representation, there are ambiguities to consider that are, to some extent, the reflection of a 
difficult environment. The aspiration to ‘normalise’ the participation of British Muslim—to emphasise that a block 
vote does not exist, or to argue that block-like voting instincts need to be overcome—is an evident concern 
among all of the respondents in our research. To some extent, this position implies a disavowal of ‘groupness’ 
and leads to strategic contradictions, such as when an emphasis on group coherence—such as on the potential 
for Muslim constituents to ‘swing’ elections—is considered strategically advantageous. 
Highlighting diversity within the ‘Muslim Vote’, organisations involved in the 2010 mobilisation are also identifying 
features of the political environment that tend to negatively affect all British Muslims. An MPAC respondent, for 
example, suggested that although ‘there's a great deal of diversity amongst Muslim communities, always in the 
plural rather than singular […] we can potentially be all victims of anti-terror legislation, stop and search, lengthy 
detention without charge, these sorts of cases’ (Interview, 28 January 2012). MPAC, however, appears to be an 
outlier among organisations that operate on a national level as it tends to frame its activism with reference to the 
global community of Muslims, the ummah. Other organisations appear more cautious in highlighting their 
encompassing concerns: ‘oppression, we don't accept it whether it is against Muslims or against any human 
being’ (Interview, 11 January 2012). Whether injustices that were seen to be impacting in particular on British 
Muslims or Muslims globally should be addressed as Muslim-specific, maybe even Muslim-exclusive, is thus 
somewhat contested. The reference to universal concerns, as it is evident in the MCB's public commitment to 
‘working towards the common good’ appears to contrasts with MPAC's emphasis. Since a broad commitment to 
justice can be inferred from Islamic scripture, and is evidently shared among the organisations in question, these 
different emphases are not necessarily the result of theological disagreement but of differences about how to 
address target audiences, such as in relation to sensitive foreign policy issues and how to access mainstream 
political channels. 
Asked about the extent to which it was possible to speak of a ‘Muslim vote’, a representative 
for Youelect suggested that it was difficult to pinpoint ‘whether the Muslim identity itself can determine which way 
they're going to vote or their personal factors, like any economic profession and country of origin’ (Interview, 25 
January 2012). Equally, the Muslim Council of Britain's mobilisations reflect this uncertainty: ‘the needs and 
aspirations of Britain's Muslim community are no different from those of our fellow citizens—whatever their beliefs 
or backgrounds’ (MCB 2005, 3). In 2010, the MCB suggested that ‘the Muslim voter, like any other Briton, may 
well make discerning choices of which their “Muslim identity”, if ever there was one, is only a part of a menu of 
considerations’ (MCB 2010). Highlighting the issue of apathy among young voters, an MCB representative 
emphasised the importance of social trends: ‘We cannot just use Muslim factors when asking ourselves why 
there are low numbers’ (Interview, 12 January 2012). In order to explain patterns of political behaviour amongst 
Muslim voters, the suggestion is that religious identities are one aspect, and not necessarily the most important 
one, that needs to be considered. 
Other activists carefully distinguished between the problematic nature of the ‘Muslim vote’ and the legitimate 
concern to mobilise on the basis of shared Muslim interests. A representative of ENGAGE, for example, indicated 
her uneasiness about the idea of a ‘Muslim Vote’ ‘because it kind of condenses and generalises and 
homogenises something that I think is a much more complex phenomenon’ (Interview, 3 February 2012). At the 
same time, the respondent indicated that the rejection of this concept reflected the exceptional status of Muslims 
who should ‘have the freedom to associate, and by virtue of association [to] create organisations’ (Interview, 3 
February 2012). This question about the coherence of the Muslim Vote and an awareness of complexities within 
the British Muslim demographic should not be used to discredit mobilisations on the basis of shared interests and 
identities, in particular not where these associational freedoms are unproblematically granted in the case of non-
Muslim social identity groups. 
With regard to the basis on which Muslims should mobilise, a different respondent argued along similar lines: ‘I'm 
not someone who favours religious politics, but I believe that there is a call for religious politics at a time when a 
particular religion is being targeted’ (Interview, 9 January 2012). The experience of stigmatisation, he suggested, 
had forged a politically salient identity. Yet the respondent equally argued that this political salience should be 
embraced for its positive potentials, rather than being rejected as abnormal or exceptional. 
If religion becomes a catalyst towards people taking part in a democratic process, I'm happy with that. If football 
becomes the catalyst for people to take part in something that is, you know, a democratic process, I'm happy for 
that. […] We have, you know, communities or groups with interests, you know, whether based on ethnicity, race, 
religion, colour, creed, hobbies, leisure, entertainment, we have that. But we're talking about it as sort of an issue 
or a problem even simply because of the type, of the context, because we're operating within a context that is 
defined by 9/11, it's defined by 7/7, it's defined by terrorism, it's defined by extremism, it's defined by wars, it's 
defined by, you know, all these issues (Interview, 9 January 2012). 
The stigmatisation of Muslim identity in the public sphere, however, meant that some organisations treaded more 
carefully in the framing of their political messages. Youelect, for example, chose not to prominently highlight 
Muslim-specific issues or even identify Muslims as its target group on its website. The concern, as the person in 
charge of the initiative suggested, was that anything with ‘the pre-fix of Islam or Muslim has a negative 
connotation immediately and I think there's a counterproductive element there’ (Interview, 25 January 2012). In 
contrast to such concerns about the risk of being dismissed or negatively perceived, other organisations 
appeared to see a certain strategic benefit in highlighting a Muslim agenda: an ‘acknowledgement that this is a 
constituency that they [politicians] cannot ignore’ (Interview, 2 February 2012). Despite difficulties in identifying a 
‘Muslim Vote’, the appeal to this concept could help to increase the public visibility of important issues that would 
elicit a response from campaigning politicians. 
Yet the concern remains an emphasis on the ‘Muslim Vote’ might encourage a certain intellectual laziness that 
was characteristic for how ethnic minority groups had been engaged in the past. The benefit of rejecting simplistic 
categories and of highlighting the multiplicity within groups would be, a respondent for ENGAGE argued, that 
you're able to populate that space and give voice to all the different perspectives that exist in the Muslim 
community, and it to me can only be a very good thing. Because it means that when politicians are looking 
around for a Muslim voice, they're all automatically confronted with Muslim voices, and they have to get over this 
idea that, you know, a Muslim voice will suffice, because they're confronted with a cacophony of voices and you 
have to deal with that cacophony. And annoying as it is, you have to deal with it, because that's the reality of the 
British Muslim community (Interview, 3 February 2012). 
The diversity among representative organisations would thus reflect the complexity of Muslims as a social group 
and make it more difficult, it is hoped, to deploy simplistic categories when accounting for British Muslim politics. 
At the same time, this emphasis on multiplicity might constitute a constraint if it hampers associational freedoms, 
the articulation of shared concern and the use of Muslim electoral significance as a bargaining chip. In this case, 
a context of misrecognition appears to account for a choice between unsatisfactory alternatives.  
Limits of Neutrality and Partisanship 
As in debates about conceptions of the ‘Muslim Vote’ and representation, Muslim activists have discussed the 
issue of neutrality in a way that reflects difficult choices. In particular the 2008 election for London Mayor appears 
to constitute a crucial case. Widely considered sympathetic to their concerns, Labour's Ken Livingstone benefited 
from Muslim support, such as that of a number of well-known activists within theMuslims4Ken initiative. Yet 
Livingstone lost the election and there were some concerns that Boris Johnson had been portrayed in a way that 
would make it more difficult for Muslims to engage in London politics. During the campaign, MPAC had urged its 
supporters to ‘help save us from a Zionist Islamophobe becoming Mayor of London’ (MPAC 2008). Responding 
to controversial statements by Boris Johnson,Muslims4Ken portrayed the Conservative candidate as an 
‘Islamophobe who has insulted and condemned Islam and Muslims’ (cited in Siddiqui2008).3 
In the Guardian, Asim Siddiqui attributed Livingstone's defeat to the backlash that these allegedly inapt efforts 
had triggered in particular among the capital's predominantly right-wing press. Siddiqui pointed to the ‘kiss of 
death’ that the association with Muslims4Ken had meant for Livingstone and to ‘the radioactive affect [sic] of 
reactionary Islam in a post-7/7 London. […] If the very candidate you are endorsing is being damaged by your 
endorsement, then surely it's time for a rethink’ (Siddiqui 2008). Disputing this account, Anas Altikriti took 
particular issue with the assumption that led Siddiqui to the conclusion that it was time to stop to mobilising the 
‘Muslim vote’ (Siddiqui 2008). Altikriti argued that ‘[t]o suggest that while Muslims can come under collective 
attack, suspicion and scrutiny as a result of crimes committed by a few, but can only defend themselves and fight 
for their rights as individuals, is nothing short of absurd—discriminatory, even’ (Altikriti 2008). Siddiqui's call for 
caution, Altikriti argued, merely reflected the stigmatisation of British Muslims as a ‘special case’ and mainstream 
attempts to discredit any collective articulation of Muslim political concerns. 
Strategic considerations about how to mobilise voters in the run-up to the general election, two years after 
Livingstone's first defeat, seemed to take account of this experience. The MCB, for example, which had not 
endorsed Livingstone, felt encouraged in its position of neutrality. An MCB respondent pointed to the significance 
of the mayoral campaign and argued that ‘it wasn't for MCB to endorse’, but rather just to ‘do everything in terms 
of […] raising issues, but stop short of saying who to put in their ballot box. It's more of service facilitation. You 
make your own mind up’ (Interview, 12 January 2012). The same MCB respondent suggested that the fact that a 
political campaign had used the notion of a ‘Muslim Vote’ in support of a specific candidate constituted an 
anomaly, similar to Siddiqui (2008) who observed that there had been no ‘JewsforBoris’ or ‘GaysforBrian’ 
campaigns: ‘You don't have a chief rabbi supporting a campaign for Boris’ (MCB, Interview, 12 January 2012). As 
a representative umbrella body, the MCB saw it necessary to maintain neutrality—despite clear affinities with Ken 
Livingstone and the Labour party—in order to be able to engage with elected representatives regardless of their 
party background. 
In the campaigns to mobilise Muslim voters in 2010, there were related differences of strategic 
positioning. Youelect, similar to the MCB's objective, primarily intended to familiarise Muslim voters with issues 
and candidates' policy record. Just before the election, however, it published links to two lists of recommended 
candidates.4 A respondent introduced the rationale for this departure from a more neutral position as follows: 
… up until, I think it was the final week or the final two weeks, we didn't favour one over the other. We just said 
this is the information, these are the priorities, here's how it works, you go and decide, and you go and decide by 
meeting in your mosques and your community centres, in your homes, by talking, by discussing, by holding 
people accountable, asking them questions. […] it was only towards, I think, the last week or 10 days of the 
elections that we started to come up with the idea of the lists, that, okay, fine […] we feel that now is the time 
when we should say well, listen, there are some really very bad candidates and regardless of where they stand 
on the playing fields, they are really, really bad candidates (Interview, 9 January 2012). 
A different respondent similarly suggested that ‘people appreciated the fact that we [Youelect] weren't spoon-
feeding them or we're not dictating on what they should be doing, we were simply directing them’ and that ‘people 
did feel empowered through Youelect but making sure we didn't encroach on their personal political space’ 
(Interview, 25 January 2012). Accordingly, the reason why the initiative eventually offered voting 
recommendations was in response to ‘a lot of push coming from the community itself’. 
By contrast, ENGAGE provided background information without offering recommendations and it was suggested 
that it ‘would never advocate that you vote for this particular candidate, because it would be irresponsible to be 
fair, but also because it's the local communities that determine which candidates they want to elect’ (Interview, 3 
February 2012). MPAC, on the other hand, was directly targeting in particular those candidates that rejected, for 
example, for their support of the war on Iraq and alleged anti-Muslim positions. Without aiming for neutrality in its 
local interventions, MPAC nonetheless did not endorse any party. It was suggested for MPAC that 
we have to be careful about how we position ourselves. So when we campaign, we campaign as an independent 
group, we are not in the pockets of anyone that we are trying to promote because what happens is, that can be 
used against them. So we're backing a candidate, for example from a party, his opposition will simply try to 
portray us as extremists and that this candidate is in the pocket of that group. So deliberately what we do is we 
keep distance from any candidate that we endorse. We're not asking for their endorsement. We're 
endorsing them.(Interview, 28 January 2012) 
For MPAC, the portrayal as ‘extremist’ was profoundly at odds with their stated purpose: ‘accusing people who 
are pro-democracy of having some kind of violent, extremist agenda. It's nonsense’ (MPAC, Interview, 28 
January 2012). Accordingly, while being opinionated and often less moderate in their messaging than other 
campaigning actors, MPAC sought to tread carefully in its relationship with the politicians that it endorsed and 
thus to avoid the ‘radioactive effects’ that (allegedly) had damaged Ken.  
Conclusion 
Traversing debates about the Muslim presence in British electoral politics, the article has examined ways in 
which Muslim organisations respond to, are bound by, and transcend the experience of misrecognition. Through 
empirical studies of activist organisations, we draw attention to the different ways in which these organisations 
speak about Muslim identities and seek to address Muslim concerns. This occurs within, and so is not immune 
from, a wider political landscape in which questions of minority agency are unsettled. The speech acts and 
positions investigated in this article reflect the attempt to respond to this landscape and to challenge 
misrecognition. 
Although misrecognition is not an unproblematic concept, it corresponds to how activists that we have 
interviewed perceive features of the mainstream response to their political presence. We have highlighted the 
need to be contextually sensitive in examining their civic and political claims; these are not merely asserted 
against, but modulated and defined in relation to the experience of misrecognition. We contend that this accounts 
for specific dilemmas such as in relation to the recurrent emphasis on maturity and sophistication, which is 
perhaps the most widely shared point of reference in the rhetoric of the various initiatives that we have explored. 
Although this emphasis appears to offer a strong challenge to portrayals of Muslim agency as ‘sectarian’ and 
‘exceptional'—along the modalities of misrecognition outlined above—it also reflects some ambiguities. While the 
definition of the ‘Muslim Vote’ as the sum of mature, discerning and ideas-based choices may hold strategic 
benefit, it may also limit the room for political manoeuvre, cement a special status and thus impede a 
normalisation of the Muslim presence in British political life. The need to address misrecognition with political 
maturity constitutes an additional burden for Muslim political agency. 
Such contexts suggest that minority political agency is shaped, though not necessarily determined, by the 
experience of misrecognition. The categories of British Muslim politics continue to develop in response to this 
experience, and there are potentials that lie in the articulation of new identities from within a state of 
misrecognition. Hence, although misrecognition has been our focus, we do not suggest that it provides the 
complete story. Experiences of misrecognition are not adequately understood if they are seen to 
be merely oppressive, limiting spaces for agency and being met by coping strategies and a posture of 
defensiveness. The political positioning that is evident among the organisations examined in this article shows 
that constraints are often creatively negotiated and that perceived pressures invite a significant degree of 
reflexivity and strategic awareness. Although these are challenging times for confident expressions of Muslim 
identities in British politics, there are some indications that political actors succeed in projecting political 
subjectivities that are not simply determined by the experience of misrecognition. The diversity of attempts to 
delineate such identities, as is evident among the mobilisations examined in this article, might indeed make it 
more difficult for Muslim political claims to be stigmatised as ‘exceptional’ or rejected. 
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1. 1 
Iris Young distinguishes between ‘identity politics’, understood as ‘solidarity-producing cultural politics’ (2000, 
103) and the ‘politics of difference’, in which claims for ‘fairness, opportunity, and political inclusion’ (2000, 107) 
emphasise, but are not reducible to, specific cultural markers. It is not the point here to argue for this type of 
nuance in political rhetoric, yet it is clear that the popular critique of ‘identity politics’ is often simplistic and 
confused. 
2. 2 
In his criticism of the MCB, Nawaz (2012) highlights the ‘unhealthy nature of communalist identity politics, and my 
preference for the citizenship model over the “umbrella” model, except in dealing with narrow religious matters’. 
We owe the reference to Nawaz to one of our anonymous reviewers. 
3. 3 
This condemnation was later rephrased in somewhat less drastic terms, suggesting that ‘Boris Johnson […] has 
insulted women, blacks, Muslims and many other groups’ (http://muslimsforken.blogspot.com/). 
4. 4 
One by the British Muslim Initiative, an organisation closely connected to Youelect, the other by Salaam.co.uk.  
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